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REGULATING THE ONE-BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES-PRECLUDING ZAIBATSU?
INTRODUCTION
The Japanese term Zaibatsu stands for the feudal control of huge
industrial combinations and banking institutions.1 It is a generic
term used to describe the large industrial and financial conglomerates
which ruled the Japanese economy immediately prior to World War
II. Mitsui, for instance, was the largest Zaibatsu in existence during
this period. Its holdings vividly demonstrate the remarkable size these
conglomerates reached. It controlled companies comparable to West-
inghouse, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Allied Chemical and Dye,
American Woolen, Celanese, International Paper, American Sugar
Refining, Anheuser-Busch, and United States Rubber, with innumer-
able subsidiaries.2 Combined it controlled 78 percent of Japan's paper
industry, 5 percent of Japan's commercial banks, 17 percent of its
trust business, 2 percent of its life insurance industry, 40 percent of
Japan's imports and exports, and 32 percent of Japan's department
stores.3 Each of the huge Zaibatsu dominated certain areas of com-
merce, industry or finance, while carefully refraining from entering
into direct competition with one another. "Students of the Japanese
economy say that a zaibatsu is probably the world's most effective in-
strument for the concentration of economic power, at least outside the
Communist bloc."4 The two main reasons for the growth of the Zai-
batsu were concessions made by the Japanese government and easy
access to credit. Government concessions were owed to the founders
of the various Zaibatsu who had aided in the restoration of the Meiji
Dynasty in 1847. Because of their aid, they were sold state properties
and given financial assistance and other assets at extremely low costs.
Access to capital was a rather simple matter for the huge Zaibatsu, for
they owned the banksl The four largest Zaibatsu controlled one bank
each, and these four banks collectively held over one-third of the de-
posits in Japan's commerical banks. They also controlled 70 percent
of the trust deposits and 20 percent of the life insurance. 5 With this
1 Hearings on H.R. 6778 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 9 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings].
2 Henderson & Henderson, Will a "Zaibatsu" Control our Economy?, 26 FE. B.J. 187
n.1 (1966) [hereinafter Henderson].
3 Id. at 187.
4 Halloran, The Zaibatsu -Is It in the U.S. Future?, Washington Post, Mar. 16, 1969,
at 8, col 2 [hereinafter Halloran].
5 Henderson, supra note 2, at 189.
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set of fortuitous circumstances, it is no wonder that the Zaibatsu at-
tained their tremendous size.
After World War II, General Douglas MacArthur outlawed the
Zaibatsu and nearly terminated them forever. However, he was forced
to allow their reorganization in order to revitalize the Japanese econ-
omy and save it from communist encroachment. In recent years the
Zaibatsu again has become a most significant factor in the Japanese econ-
omy. Mitsubishi is now the largest. In 1967, it accounted for 7 percent
of Japan's gross national product. By comparison, an American con-
glomerate, accounting for the same percentage of the United States gross
national product in the fields of commerce and finance, would control
Sears 9c Roebuck, American Export Lines, the First National City Bank
of New York, and the Prudential Life Insurance Co.6 The only real
difference between the pre-war and post-war Zaibatsus is that Japanese
law no longer permits banks to form holding companies. For this
reason it is felt that as huge as the Zaibatsu presently are, they will not
be able to regain the position of dominance that they held before
World War II.7
Before the war the Zaibatsu, through their dominance over large
financial institutions, were able to exercise control, whether directly
or indirectly, over every aspect of the Japanese economy. With regard
to industry, if a competing industrial company needed a loan or other
financial assistance, it was forced either to go to a bank which the
Zaibatsu owned or to go to a bank which the Zaibatsu indirectly con-
trolled. A competitor of the Zaibatsu was therefore at its mercy if in
need of financial assistance. Moreover, where the competitor was fairly
successful in hurting the Zaibatsu's endeavors in that particular area of
industry, it could possibly find itself without credit.
The Zaibatsu's monopolistic control of certain aspects of Japan's
economy generated large profits. These profits were used to buy out
existing competitors in the fields they were engaged in and also to
enter into new fields of economic activity. By the beginning of World
War II, 15 Zaibatsu, which had been formed in 1847, controlled 70
percent of the entire Japanese trade and industry.8 Because of American
termination of the Zaibatsu's traditional method of operation during
our occupation of Japan, there is no way of knowing how much larger
the Zaibatsu would have grown. It does, however, seem safe to state
6 Halloran, supra note 4. In the industrial field this giant conglomerate would include
U.S. Steel, General Motors, General Electric, Eastman Kodak, Mobil Oil, Celanese, Inter-
national Paper and Anaconda. Id.
7Japan's Remarkable Industrial Machine, Busmss WEEK, Mar. 7, 1970, at 59.
s Henderson at 187.
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that they would have continued to develop and merge until they
reached a point where a few Zaibatsu would have controlled nearly all
of Japan's trade and industry.
In the late 1960's, Congress took note of the fact that an ameri-
canized Zaibatsu System was coming into being. This potentiality was
created by a gaping loophole in the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956, as amended in June, 1966.0 This loophole simply was that the
legislation did not include a corporation which owned or controlled
only one bank. By late 1968, over 780 one-bank holding companies,
with combined assets of over 108.2 billion dollars, had been formed
to take advantage of this statutory imperfection.'0 The reason that
this form of organization was so attractive was that, while the 1956 Act
made it compulsory for companies owning or controlling 25 percent
of two or more banks" to register with the Federal Reserve Board and
seek its approval for their proposed activities, there was no such restric-
tion placed on corporations owning only one bank. In 1956, Congress
decided that there was no need to regulate one-bank holding com-
panies12 and in 1966, it again reached the same conclusion. The reason
given was that existing one-bank holding companies were relatively
small companies controlling relatively small banks. They were not
seen as a dominant factor in the United States economy at that point.
However, in 1967 a trend developed for extremely large banks (assets
over 1 billion dollars) to form one-bank holding companies and then
take advantage of the fact that they were free to enter into non-finan-
cial activities without being regulated by any government agency.
Thus the nation's six largest banks, which cumulatively held more
than 20 percent of the entire deposits in the nation's banking system,
formed one-bank holding companies.' 3
These six banks and all others operating within the one-bank
holding company structure were allowed to enter into non-financial
fields by setting up subsidiaries of the holding company. The only
major restriction placed on their freedom was that the bank could
not legally lend more funds to an affiliate unless the loan was secured
9 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Act of May 9, 1956, ch. 240, §§ 2-10, 70 Stat.
133-39 [hereinafter 1956 Act], as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50, 1971-78 (1970).
10 Hearings, supra note 1, at 1.
111956 Act, supra note 9, § 2(a)(1), (2), (3).
12 Id.
13 Bank of America, NT & SA, San Francisco, Cal.; Chase Manhattan Bank NA, New
York, N.Y.; First National City Bank, New York, N.Y.; Manufacturer's Hanover Trust,
New York, N.Y.; Morgan Guaranty Trust, New York, N.Y.; Chemical Bank New York
Trust Co., N.Y. -H. Porar, ONE-BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 18 (Practicing Law Institute -
Corporate Law and Practice Handbook No. 18, 1969) [hereinafter PoT.RE].
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by collateral in the form of bonds, stocks, etc., which had a market
value of at least 20 percent more than the amount of the loan when
made or of at least 10 percent if secured by the obligations of a state or
any political subdivision thereof.14 This restriction was no problem
for the giant multi-billion dollar one-bank holding companies. The
growth record of these financial conglomerates illustrates that the loan-
to-affiliate restriction did little, if anything, to prevent their formation.
The problems created by entry of these gigantic one-bank holding com-
panies into non-financial areas were essentially the same as those
created by the Zaibatsu in Japan, i.e., they were easily able to stifle
competition because they controlled the lines of credit in broad geo-
graphical areas of the country. This was accomplished either directly
or indirectly. The bank would either condition a loan on the customer's
promise to use the services of the holding company's subsidiaries or a
potential lendee would utilize the holding companies' other subsid-
iaries instead of its competitors in the hope of receiving favorable
treatment when it applied for its assistance.
As of September 1, 1968, one-bank holding companies were
known to be active in 99 different non-financial activities.15 Com-
menting on the potential dangers of this situation, President Nixon
stated that
left unchecked, the trend toward the combining of banking and
business could lead to the formation of a relatively small number
of power centers dominating the American economy. This must not
be permitted to happen; it would be bad for banking, bad for
business, and bad for borrowers and consumers.
The strength of our economic system is rooted in diversity and
free competition; the strength of our banking system depends
largely on its independence. Banking must not dominate commerce
or be dominated by it.
To protect competition and the separation of economic
powers, I strongly endorse the extension of Federal Regulation to
one-bank holding companies and urge the Congress to take prompt
and appropriate action.' 6
Congress, in December of 1970, enacted amendents to the 1956
1412 U.S.C. § 371(c) (1970).
15 For an exhaustive list demonstrating that one-bank holding companies had entered
into more than ninety five (95) different non-financial activities which ranged from farming
to manufacturing of tires and inner tubes, see STAFF REPORT FOR HousE Com/-a. BANKING
AND CURRENCY, 91St CONG., 1st Sess. (1970). THE GROWTH OF UNREGISTERED HOLDING COMPA-
NIES-PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, TABLE 10 at 49-50 (GPO 1969), as cited in H. PoTrn 24-25.
16 STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE HousE, Conference Report No.
91-1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 5561, 5562 (1970) [hereinafter AD. NEws] (statement by President Nixon, Mar. 24,
1969).
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Bank Holding Company Act. 17 This note will provide comprehensive
treatment concerning the history of the one-bank holding company, its
potential ruinous effect on competition in both financial and non-finan-
cial areas, and the method by which Congress has decided to deal with
these financial institutions.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ONE-BANK HOLDING COMPANY
To appreciate the effect of the 1970 amendments to the Bank
Holding Company Act, it is first necessary to understand the 1956 Act.
It defines a bank holding company as any organization which directly
or indirectly owns, controls or has power to vote 25 percent or more
of the voting shares of two or more banks.18 Only a corporation is
covered by the Act-an individual or partnership being exempted from
its regulations.19 Apparently, these two categories were excluded from
the purview of the statute since they represented an impractical means
of carrying on a venture such as a bank holding company with its vast
capital requirements. Also exempted are (a) banks holding shares in
a fiduciary capacity, (b) a company engaged in underwriting securities
held for brief periods of time, (c) companies formed solely for the
purpose of participation in a proxy solicitation, and (d) a company
which owns only one bank. Under the Act, a company may not become
a bank holding company, as defined, without prior approval by the
Federal Reserve Board,20 and it is also illegal for a holding company
to acquire bank stock or assets or to merge with another bank holding
company without the consent of the Federal Reserve Board.21 This
approval is necessary if, after the proposed acquisition of stock, the
bank holding company will own or control more than 5 percent of the
voting shares of the other bank.22 It is also needed if the holding com-
pany or one of its non-banking subsidiaries wishes to acquire almost
all of the assets of another bank.23 There are minor exceptions to this
needed approval. Section 3 of the Act establishes the procedure by
which the Federal Reserve Board will either approve or disapprove
each application. The application is considered on the basis of what
effect the proposed acquisition or merger would have on the safety of
depositors' funds and whether it will provide the banking public with
17 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50, 1971-78
(1970) [hereinafter 1970 Amendments], formerly ch. 240, §§ 2-10, 70 Stat. 133-39 (1956).
18 1956 Act § 2(a)(1).
19 ld. § 2(b)(3).
20 Id. § 3(a)(1).
21 1d. § 3(a)(3), (4).
22 Id. § 3(a)(2).
23 Id. § 3(a)(3).
[Vol. 46:320
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adequate banking services. In addition the Act provides for judicial
review of disapproved applications in certain instances.2 4
The most important section of the 1956 Act and one of the
reasons one-bank holding companies were formed is section 4(2)(1).
This section forbade a holding company from acquiring ownership
or control of the voting shares of any company that is not a bank.
Therefore registered bank holding companies under the 1956 Act
could not become engaged in non-financial activities. They were per-
mitted to participate only in whatever services banks were allowed to
perform. Moreover, the Act called for complete divestiture of all non-
bank holdings within two years of its passage.25 But, there was a
ceiling on this austere approach as registered bank holding companies
were permitted to acquire
shares of any company all the activities of which are of a financial,
fiduciary or insurance nature, and which the board after due
notice and hearing, and on the basis of the record made at such
hearing, by order has determined to be so closely related to the
business of banking or of managing or controlling banks as to be a
proper incident thereto and as to make it unnecessary for the
prohibitions of this section to apply in order to carry out the
purposes of this chapter 2 6
The subsidiary bank was also forbidden to make loans either to the
holding company or to another subsidiary.27 This section of the Act
was repealed in 1966,28 and now the held-bank is free to make loans to
both the holding company and its subsidiaries. The Act also reserves
to the states the right to enact more stringent legislation than that
which exists in the federal realm.29 Several states have taken advan-
tage of this and have prohibited bank holding companies from being
formed in their jurisdictions.30
As previously mentioned, Congress in passing the 195& Act, did
not include within its coverage companies owning only one bank. x
Accordingly, the method of avoiding the strict prohibitions of the
1956 Act was available. Now let us examine some of the considerations
241d. § 9.
21; Id. 4(a)(2).
26 Id. § 4(c)(6).27 id. §6(a)(4).
28 See note 14 supra.
29 1956 Act § 7.
80 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16 , §§ 71-76 (Smith-Hurd 1963); IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 18-1814 to 18-1817 (1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-504 to 9-507 (1964); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 8-901 to 8-904 (1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 502 (1966); PA. STAT. tit. 7, §§ 6001-05
(1967).
31 See note 12 supra.
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which prompted banks to avail themselves of the one-bank holding
company advantages.
First, by 1960 there were severe governmental controls on bank
mergers, the expansion of banks, and registered bank holding com-
panies. Because of the increased amount of big bank mergers in the
1950's, the enactment of the Bank Merger Act of 1960, coupled with
a 1963 Supreme Court decision 2 which held that bank mergers are
subject to antitrust laws, led banks to fear that any expansion into
larger geographical areas through merger would possibly be ruled
violative of the antitrust laws and accordingly they looked for other
means of growth.
Second, bank credit was significantly expanded in the 1960's.
This can be explained by:
(1) The new freedom of commercial banks to compete for deposits,
a consequence of the increases in the maximum permissible
rates they could pay on time and savings deposits.
(2) the extraordinary increase in the volume of such funds.
(3) the incessant demands for commercial, industrial, and other
loans.
(4) the willingness of the Federal Reserve to supply the necessary
funds; and
(5) the recognition - following the Supreme Court decision in
June 1963 in the Philadelphia National Bank case -of the
national policy favoring competition in the field of money,
credit, and financial services. 83
Third, the growth of time and savings deposits together with the
successively higher interest rates banks could pay on such funds,
3 4
caused a sharp rise in operating expenses. For example, the interest
costs to 25 large banks in 1967 was five times their 1960 costs.35 Be-
cause of these tremendous additional expenses, banks were forced to
seek higher yielding loans and investments. This necessitated entry into
new fields where money, credit and financial services could be employed
at a higher profit.
32 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 221 (1963), citing 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(c) (1970).
33 Congress and the Congenerics, BANK STOCK Q., Sept. 1968, at 7, col. 1 (footnote
omitted).
34 The rate of interest a commercial bank is permitted to pay on deposits is con-
trolled by the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Q. It was first set up at 22 percent.
This 2 percent figure remained in force from January, 1936 until January of 1957 when
it was raised to 3 percent. On Jan. 1, 1962 it was raised to 4 percent. On Nov. 24, 1964
it went to 4V percent. An increase of one percent raised it to 52 percent on Dec. 6, 1965
and another three-quarter percent increase raised it to 6 percent on Apr. 19, 1968. Id.
at 7 n.5.
35 Note 3 supra.
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Fourth, the technological revolution which occurred in the United
States in the 1960's has enabled the banks to vastly increase their
markets. The use of the computer alone has given banks access to varie-
gated data concerning potential customers which was never before
available. Between the accessibility of the computer and the excellent
telecommunciations now available in the United States the service
area of any large bank encompasses the entire country and not just
its local area.
Because of the increased costs, technological advances and rigid
antitrust laws, the banks were forced to undertake a variety of new
services such as equipment leasing, factoring, mortgage banking,
travel agencies, computer services, accounting, life insurance, mutual
funds, auto dealerships, armored carrier and special courier operations,
and stockbrokerage. There were also many other services which all
banks would have desired to enter, but under the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act, they had to justify their non-banking activities as either
... of a financial, fiduciary or insurance nature..." and had to prove
to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Board that these new ser-
vices were "so closely related to the business of banking ... as to be
a proper incident thereto ... ."36 However, the banks were not satisfied
with having to argue that a proposed new service was "closely related
to banking" each time they formed a new division or subsidiary to
provide an additional service. Even banks which did not choose to
become bank holding companies are not permitted to conduct any
activities which are not "incidental to the business of banking.
37
Previously, banks attempted to expand into non-banking activi-
ties by broadly interpreting the "incidental powers" clause of the
National Bank Act38 which authorizes general banking practices as
well as any incidental powers necessary to carry on the business of
banking.39
Due to the increasing costs and competition from non-banking
sources,40 banks were hoping to expand their economic activities and
began interpreting this incidental power clause liberally. Moreover,
36 1956 Act § 4(c)(6).
37 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1970).
38 For an excellent article dealing with the banks' efforts to expand on the "incidental
powers" clause, see Edwards, The One-Bank-Holding Company Conglomerate: Analysis
and Evaluation, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1275, 1278 et seq. (1969).
30 See note 36 supra.
40 During the 1960's, banks found themselves competing with many new entrants
into the credit business. To purchase an expensive new consumer item such as an auto-
mobile, one no longer had to go to a bank for credit. The automobile manufacturers
themselves set up subsidiaries to finance the consumer's new vehicle. This naturally cut
into the banks' money lending abilities and decreased their profits.
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the Comptroller of the Currency gave a beneficial boost to this move-
ment by construing this clause- to permit banks to enter into fields
which had never before been seen as bank related. Thus, national banks
became involved in equipment leasing, factoring, mortgage banking,
travel agencies, computer services, accounting services, etc., all with the
blessings of John Saxon, the Comptroller of the Currency.
While they may have had the blessing of Mr. Saxon, they cer-
tainly didn't have those of their new competitors. The competitors
took the banks to court, attempting to prove that these new banking
activities were not incidental to the business of banking and that Saxon,
as the Comptroller of the Currency, had no authority to permit banks to
enter into these new activities.
The first case concerning this struggle between the banks and
their new competitors was Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon.41 There, plain-
tiff investment brokers sought declaratory relief invalidating the Comp-
troller's regulation allowing a bank to underwrite obligations of states
and political subdivisions thereof on the ground that such obligations
were not secured by the general power of taxation. Plaintiffs also
sought to enjoin the Comptroller from authorizing this new service.
The court held for the plaintiffs, reasoning that the applicable federal
law,42 which prohibits banks from underwriting securities, should be
strictly construed and that national banks should not be allowed to
underwrite these obligations unless they are issued by a governmental
entity endowed with the general taxing power. Unfortunately, the
court never discussed the issue of whether this banking service, had
it been allowed, would have been "incidental to the business of bank-
ing."
The next court test came in Georgia Association of Independent
Insurance Agents, Inc. v. Saxon,43 where the plaintiffs, a group of
independent insurance agents, sought to enjoin the Comptroller of the
the Currency from issuing an alleged illegal administrative ruling per-
mitting banks to operate as insurance agents in towns in excess of
5,000 population. Drawing upon a statutory mandate, the court held
that this was in direct violation of section 92 of title 12, United States
Code, which permits banks to act as insurance agents only in towns of
less than 5,000 population. Again the court did not decide whether
this activity was "incidental to the power of banking."
In the case of Dickinson v. First National Bank44 the Comptroller
41261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966).
42 12 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970).
43268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ga. 1967), aff'd', 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).




of the State of Florida contended that the defendant bank's policy
of placing deposit receptacles and using armored cars to accept deposits
was prohibited under Florida's branch banking statutes.4 5 The Comp-
troller of the Currency of the United States argued as intervenor for
the defendants that the banks' activities "did not constitute 'branching'
as defined . . . in the National Banking Act"46 and "therefore, [were]
not within the coverage" of the Florida statute. The district court
rendered judgment for the plaintiff because it felt that the Florida
statute was not operative in this instance. The Fifth Circuit overruled
this decision, on the ground that permitting the continuance of this
activity by national banks while state banks were prohibited from this
same endeavor would be violative of the competitive equality theory as
set forth in the McFadden Act. Once more the court never reached the
question of whether these activities were "incidental to the business of
banking."
Standing to sue became an important issue in these cases. The
Comptroller of the Currency defended on the grounds that a com-
petitor of a bank does not have standing to sue the Comptroller con-
cerning his administrative rulings, in the landmark case of Association
of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.47 The district
court ruled in favor of the Comptroller and denied standing to the
plaintiff48 and the Eighth Circuit affirmed on appeal.49 But, the Supreme
Court reversed and granted the plaintiffs standing. While this de-
cision was impressive because it redefined those who have standing
in the federal courts, it still did not, answer the nagging question of
whether data processing services are "incidental to the business of
banking."
Due to the regulations concerning mergers, increasing costs, vastly
improved technology and restrictive court decisions, the banks, finally,
turned to the one-bank holding company as a vehicle for expansion.
While this business structure had been available as a method of opera-
tion since 1956, it was not until 1968, when the First National City Bank
of New York made taking advantage of this loophole respectable, by
doing so itself, 0 that banks began rushing to form one-bank holding
companies.
45 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 659.06 (1966).
46 12 US.C. § 36() (1970).
47 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968), aff'di 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969), rev'd. 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
48 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968).
49 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969).,
50 The Furor in Banking, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1969, at col. 4.
1971]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
THE ECONOMIC EFFECr OF ONE-BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
The Effect on Competition
Many one-bank holding companies operate as financial congenerics
in that they attempt to control the area of finance. 51 They also endeavor
to provide as many customer services as possible in order to increase
profits. The problem created through this congeneric set-up is that
there is a strong possibility of coercive activities. These tactics may be
of a direct or indirect nature. Held-banks are easily able to force
"borrowers, particularly small businesses, to purchase non banking
services and goods from other subsidiaries of the holding company in
order to obtain banking services, and credit, thus further tightening
control and forcing a greater concentration of economic power. '5 2
The one-bank holding company may also control segments of the
economy indirectly.
Let us, suppose that the held-bank has as a client business concern,
a trucking company, and that one of the companies in the bank
holding complex is a leasing company whose business is buying
trucks and leasing them to users. The leasing company buys trucks
in quantity and leases them to the client trucking company. The
trucker's lease payments are, of course in effect, payments of interest
and principal on an agreed amount with the leasing company
covering the purchase price of the trucks it uses- a sort of dis-
guised long-term debt. The leasing company can arrange that the
trucking company operate with trucks of this or that or the other
truck manufacturer. Having that power, the holding company or
its subsidiary, the leasing company, can bargain with the truck
manufacturer. It will naturally favor the truck manufacturer whose
sale price offers the most profit to the leasing company. It can then
indicate to its client trucking concern that it had best use the
vehicles of that manufacturer. Absent competition, the truck
manufacturer and the truck hauler alike can be controlled even
though the bank holding company does not own a share of stock
in either.53
There is also the possibility of the one-bank holding company's sub-
sidiaries receiving business that they ordinarily would not have re-
ceived because the customer wants to be looked upon favorably when
he goes to the held-bank for credit. With the one-bank holding com-
pany in existence before the 1970 amendments, there was no way of
checking to see to what extent this was occurring and while there was
nothing illegal about it, it was severely detrimental to competitors of
51 See Note, Banks and Banking: The 1956 Bank Holding Company Act and the
Development of the One-Bank Holding Companies, 23 OKLA. L. REv. 73 (1970).
52 Hearings at 2 (Introductory remark by Congressman Patman).
53 Id. at 18-19 (Statement of Professor A.A. Berle).
[Vol. 46:320
PRECLUDING ZAIBA TSU
the one-bank holding companies' subsidiaries. Another adverse effect
on competition was the fact that since the large one-bank holding com-
panies were congenerics, i.e., they controlled the financial resources of an
entire segment of the country, competitors of the holding companies'
subsidiaries were forced to obtain credit from the holding companies'
bank.
The system also had a deleterious effect on what little competition
the small banks in the area offered to the huge held-bank. For example,
most one-bank holding companies had travel-agency subsidiaries. The
financial implications and monopolistic potentialities in this service
were tremendous. The subsidiary bank financed the customers' vaca-
tion and the travel agency arranged it. As the holding companies' main
interest in this venture was to gain maximum profits from the loan its
bank made, it could afford to run the travel agency at a small loss if
this were deemed necessary to attract customers. The travel agency
would, of course, only perform its services for a customer if he agreed
to have his vacation financed through the bank. This procedure is
referred to as a tie-in, i.e., one of the bank holding companies ties in
its services with an agreement that the customer will go to the held-
bank for a loan. This has adversely affected other banks in that the
travel agency controls which bank the customer goes to for credit and
it obviously also has had a ruinous effect on other travel agencies to
the point that it has driven many out of business.
The American Society of Travel Agents, Inc. appeared before
the House Committee on Banking and Currency concerning the pro-
posed legislation to restrict the activities of one-bank holding com-
panies and dearly demonstrated many of the unfair competitive
practices used by holding-company owned travel agencies to lure away
independent travel-agency customers and employees.54 Those men-
tioned were:
(1) "The travel agents must use banks for their deposits, receipts
and payments. Therefore, the bank has a readymade source of informa-
tion concerning anything the agency customer does."
(2) The bank is in a fiduciary capacity with the travel agency
customer. Yet, it is also a competitor.
(3) "The bank can afford to subsidize its travel activities for a
considerable period of time in order to attract more depositors."
(4) The bank can afford to hire away all of the independent
agency's best employees and take advantage of their knowledge.
(5) "Banks can exercise extensive influence on the business,
54 Id. at 808, 810.
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commercial and industrial organizations who are their customers for
placing their travel business with the bank as a part of the general
service the bank makes available to them."
(6) The independent agent actually has to borrow money from
its competitor. 55
Generally these arguments can be made against all of the new
services into which one-bank holding companies have entered. The
basic criticism is that the held-bank can dangle credit over the heads
of the customers of the other subsidiaries' competitors and easily con-
vince them to do business with the subsidiary and not the competitor.
For instance, in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel,56 plaintiff
sought treble damages and injunctive relief for alleged violations of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, by defendant, U.S. Steel, and its
subsidiary, U.S. Steel Homes Credit Corp. Plaintiff alleged that it
had been forced "to purchase at artificially high prices prefabricated
houses manufactured by U.S. Steel" as a condition for obtaining credit.
The Supreme Court here held for the first time that credit is to
be treated in essentially the same manner as other goods and services,
for trying it to demands for other transactions was deemed violative
of the antitrust laws. While this was a step in the proper direction,
it did not effectively deter one-bank holding company congenerics
since it is difficult to prove allegedly forced agreements in the antitrust
area. It must be remembered that potential witnesses will still need cre-
dit from the held-bank and therefore will be reluctant to commit econ-
omic suicide by testifying against their source of credit. Consequently,
it has been the feeling of the economic experts57 that the antitrust laws,
even if fully enforced, are inadaquate to control the unchecked growth
of the one-bank holding company and to prevent the emergence of an
American Zaibatsu System.
Problems in Managing the Congenerics
Managing the huge congenerics was extremely difficult. For in-
stance, this growth mandated a larger staff of employees. With this
rise in personnel came the need for additional skills and training.
While the management of the bank was competent within its own
field, it lacked expertise in running travel agencies, insurance agencies,
armored car companies, etc. This led to the possibility of instability
as the management attempted to master the evergrowing number of
55 Id. at 810-11.
56 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
57 Hearings at 9, 20 (Statements of Professors Berle and Schwartz respectively).
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services it was providing. Furthermore, there was the danger that the
management in its attempts to make all subsidiaries profitable, might
make loans to a subsidiary which it would not have made if the sub-
sidiary of the holding company were just another customer and not in-
volved in the holding company complex. It is conceivable that one of
these gargantuan congenerics could have so improvidently extended
credit as to result in a total business failure. Failure of a bank this size
would surely have wreaked economic chaos on a broad geographical seg-
ment of the United States.
Tm 1970 AMENDMENTS
Because of the fear that the economic structure of the country
would be changed by the one-bank holding company and that it
would lead to ".... erosion of the traditional separation of powers be-
tween the suppliers of money - the banks - and the users of money
- commerce and industry . . .,"5 it was almost universally believed
that the one-bank holding company exemption should be removed.
There were many bills proposed in Congress, all of which contained
varying methods of dealing with this problem.J9 The bill introduced
by Congressman Patman on February 17, 1969, H.R. 6778, was ulti-
mately passed by both the House and Senate Committees in substan-
dally the same form as introduced.60 Since tracing the legislative
history of the rejected bills would be of little or no utility, this section
will concentrate on an analysis of H.R. 6778 as amended and discuss
its impact on the one-bank holding company.
H.R. 6778, as originally introduced, plugged the existing loop-
hole by redefining the terms "bank holding company" and "control."
It also accomplished six other objectives for tightening the 1956 Bank
Holding Company Act:
(1) It removed the partnership exemption;
(2) It provided that the Federal Reserve Board could find
actual control of a bank by a company even though that company
controlled less than 25% of the stock of the bank;
(3) It retained the 1956 definition of what constituted a per-
missible bank-related activity for bank-holding companies to engage
in;
(4) It contained no grandfather clause exemption;
(5) It contained an anti-tie-in provision applying to all in-
58 AD. NEws, supra note 16, at 5562 (Statement of President Nixon Mar. 24, 1969).
59S. 1052, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) [Introduced by Senator Proxmire on Feb. 18,
1969]; H.R. 6778, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [Introduced by Congressman Patman on
Feb. 17, 1969].
CO AD. Nmvs 5563.
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sured banks, whether or not it is part of a holding company system;
(6) It removed the exemption in the 1956 Act for bank stock
held in trust by a bank.0 1
As previously noted the Act eliminated the one-bank holding
company exemption by simply redefining the term "bank holding com-
pany." The 1956 Act covered all companies which owned or controlled
25 percent or more of the voting stock of two or more banks. H.R. 6778,
as amended, alters the 1956 Act to cover ". . . any company which has
control over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank
holding company by virtue of this Chapter." 62 The authors of the Bill
also recognized that it was possible for one-bank holding companies to
exercise control over banks without actual ownership. Accordingly, con-
trol was defined as (A) the ownership, control or power to vote 25 per-
cent or more of the bank's voting shares; (B) controlling elections of
the majority of the Board of Directors; or (C) a Board determination
that a controlling influence is exercised over the management policies of
the bank.63 The Act has created a presumption that under (C) above, a
company is in control of a bank or company unless it, at the time in
question, "directly or indirectly owns or controls, or has power to vote
less than 5 % or more of any class of voting securities." 64 Thus, under
these two sections, the one-bank holding company exemption has been
completely removed and the possibilities of indirect control over a bank
are under much closer Federal Reserve Board scrutiny than ever before.
The most troublesome area concerning the passage of this bill
through both the House and Senate was section 1843(c)(8), which
deals with bank-related activities. As originally introduced, the bill
would have retained the 1956 Act's definition of what constituted a
permissible bank-related activity in which bank-holding companies may
engage. This was "so closely related to the business of banking ... as
to be a proper incident thereto."65 The House passed H.R. 6778 with a
rewritten section 1843(c)(8) test which permitted a bank holding com-
pany to engage in any non-banking activity that was "functionally re-
lated to banking" and could be reasonably expected to produce public
benefits which would outweigh adverse anti-competitive effects. This
measure also included six specific activities from which bank holding
61 Id.
62 1970 Amendments, supra note 17, § 1841(a)(1) (emphasis added).
03 Id. § 1841(a)(2)(A), (B), (C).
64Id. § 1841(a)(3).
65 1956 Act § 4(c)(6).
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companies were either barred or were permitted to participate in to a
limited extent. These six became known as the "laundry list."
The Senate version of the bill retained the "functionally re-
lated to banking" language and the public benefits test but did not
include any prohibited activities. Because this section dealt with the
activities bank holding companies would be allowed to be engaged
in, this distinction between the two bills became a crucial issue. The
joint conference was able to resolve the issue only by inserting sub-
stitutional language in both versions of the bill.66
It is perhaps important here to note that the Patman Bill, H.R.
6778 as enacted, 6 retained the provisions of the 1956 Act which gave
the Federal Reserve Board the sole right to decide whether a parti-
cular activity was "closely related to banking." A possible explanation
for Congressman Patman's reluctance to include the Department of
the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency in this rule-making
group is the liberal attitude taken by the Comptroller of the Currency
in recent years in his administration of the National Bank Act. The
Federal Reserve Board has traditionally been more conservative
in its approach to banking and the Congressman must have believed
that the Board would be more inclined to safeguard the intentions of
the Congress in its passage of the Act. 68
The 1956 Act in section 4(c) used the following language to de-
scribe activities it did not forbid:
Shares of any company all the activities of which are of a financial,
fiduciary or insurance nature and which the Board after due notice
and hearing, and on the basis of the record made at such hearing,
by order has determined to be so closely related to the business of
banking or of managing or controlling banks as to be a proper
incident thereto and as to make it unnecessary for the prohibitions
of this section to apply in order to carry out the purposes of the
Act.69
The language of section 1843(c)(8) under the 1970 amendments
reads as follows:
Shares of any company the activities of which the Board after
due notice and opportunity for hearing, has determined to be
66 AD. NEws 5565.
67 1970 Amendments § 1843(c)(8).
68 Cf. Treasury Toughens 1-Bank Holding Co. Measure to Meet Objections in Con-
gress, AMERmcAN BANKER (Feb. 20, 1969); Single Agency Veto Over HC's Is Scored, id. (Feb.
24, 1969); Bank Agencies, Treasury Meet on 1-Bank HC Proposal, id. (Feb. 25, 1969);
Alexander Warns One-Bank HC Bill Is Step to Single-Agency Power, id. (Apr. 16, 1969).
69 1956 Act § 4(c)(6).
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(by order or regulation) so closely related to banking or manag-
ing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.
In determining whether a particular activity is a proper in-
cident to banking or managing or controlling banks the Board
shall consider whether its performance by an affiliate of a hold-
ing company can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to
the public, such as greater convenience, increased competition,
or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects,
such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair
competition, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices.
In orders and regulations under this subsection the Board may
differentiate between activities commenced de novo and activi-
ties commenced by acquisition, in whole or in part, of a going
concern.
7 0
A comparison of the two sections reveals that there were some
significant changes. The first is that the new section deletes the phrase "of
a financial, fiduciary or insurance nature." The statement on the part of
the Managers of the House indicates that the rationale behind the
elimination of this phrase was to avoid redundancy, i.e., it was believed
that the language, "so closely related to Banking... as to be a proper
incident thereto ... ," was sufficient to include activities of a financial,
fiduciary and insurance nature. Another explanation for the deletion of
this phrase is that it was omitted in order to make sure that large one-
bank holding companies did not purchase huge insurance company
affiliates. Had the insurance language not been omitted, the holding
companies could have argued that the provisions of the 1970 Amend-
ments specifically allowed them to hold insurance-company affiliates.
The combination of a huge one-bank holding company held-bank and
a large insurance company within the same holding company complex
would be exactly the type of undue concentration of financial resources
that the Amendments were necessary to prevent.71
Another major change in section 1843(c)(8) was the retention of
70 1970 Amendments § 1843(c)(8).
71 By early 1969, Congressman Patman, Chairman of the House Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, initiated hearings concerning the unchecked growth of one-bank hold-
ing companies; at the time four of the largest banks in New York City were considering
acquisition of major insurance companies by way of their holding companies. The nego-
tiations were finally suspended pending outcome of the Bill. Congressman Patman com-
mented on these proposed acquisitions as follows:
The half dozen largest banks in New York could acquire the six largest insurance
corporations and through fractional reserves could have enough money to then
buy up almost all the profitable manufacturing and industrial corporations in
America.
Shapiro, The Profit Motive and the Public Interest: Wright Patman vs. The Bankers,
RAMPARTS, Mar. 1971, at 18, 20, col. 1. This method of concentrating economic power
would be the quickest method imaginable of establishing an American Zaibatsu System.
Contra, AD. NEws 5565.
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the term "closely related" as it appeared in the 1956 Act. Both the
House and the Senate had passed the Bill with the language "func-
tionally related to banking" inserted instead of "closely related." The
Federal Reserve Board had requested the "functionally related" lan-
guage.72 Those who advocated the "functionally related" language be-
lieved it was more liberal than the "closely related" criteria. They
opined that it would grant greater discretion to the Federal Reserve
Board in its rulings on proposed new activities. Proponents of this
phrase felt that it would allow bank holding companies to engage in
new activities which would not have been permitted under the 1956
language. It was the general opinion of those desiring this change that
the phrase "so closely related" was too restrictive and did not give the
Federal Reserve Board sufficient discretion to keep pace with the de-
velopment of new banking services. The joint conference, however,
rejected the "functionally related" test and retained the "closely re-
lated" language. This must be construed to mean that Congress did not
intend to liberalize the test as passed in 1956. The proposed acquisition,
in order to be approved by the Federal Reserve Board, must bear a
direct and significant connection between the business of banking, as
it is now carried on, and the activities of the new acquisition.
The new section 1843(c)(8) is actually a harsher standard than the
old one, because it now contains the "public benefits" test which was
not in the 1956 Act. Under this test, the applicant must not only prove
that the proposed activity is closely related to banking, but it also has
the burden of proving that the activity to be performed by an affiliate
can be reasonably expected to produce benefits to the public. These
benefits must outweigh possible adverse effects, "such as undue con-
centration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of
interest, or unsound banking practices."73 Possible public benefits
would include "greater convenience, increased competition and gains
72 AD. NEws 5566 (Federal Reserve Board Chairman William McChesney Martin was
the first to suggest and support the language).
73 1970 Amendments § 1843(c)(8). With regard to anti-competitive effects some of the
factors the Federal Reserve Board would consider are:
(a) Intimidation of customers to cause them to refrain from buying a competitor's
products'(b) commercal espionage with the purpose of procuring confidential information
that could be used unfairly in competing with a non-bank competitor. (This is
particularly applicable to banking institutions since they deal to a very great ex-
tent with confidential information obtained from customers);
(c) inducing breach of contract;
(d) enticing away competitor's employees in order to cripple his business;(e) price discrimination;
(f) selling a service below cost or offering a service for no cost in order to obtain a
business for another subsidiary;(g) harrassing practices such as intimidating customers and/or competitors.
AD. NEws 5569-70 [House Managers Statement].
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in efficiency."74 The Board must consider whether the proposed new
activity will come about through acquisition or de novo entry into a
field. De novo entry should be encouraged as it increases competition.
On the other hand, the acquisition of going concerns should be weighed
heavily against public benefits. Acquisition reduces competition -
acquisition of a going concern in a field where the holding company
is already involved should not be allowed, but if it is, it should serve
as an extremely important negative factor in the Federal Reserve
Board's determination. It is entirely possible that a proposed new ac-
tivity will pass the "closely related to banking" test and fail the "pub-
lic benefits" test. In this event, section 1843(c)(8) 75 mandates that the
Federal Reserve Board deny the application.
Section 4(a)(2) is the divestiture section and it has been substan-
tially amended by section 1848(a)(2). The main thrust of this section
is that a bank holding company may not retain ownership or control of
any company which is not a bank. The 1956 Act read:
engage in any business other than that of banking or managing
or controlling banks or of furnishing services to or performing
services for any bank of which it owns or controls 25% or more
of the voting shares.76
The 1970 Amendments change this to:
engage in any activities other than (A) those of banking or of
managing or controlling banks and other subsidiaries authorized
under this Chapter or of furnishing services to or performing
services for its subsidiaries, and (B) those permitted under para-
graph (8) of subsection (c).77
The major change brought about by the amendment with regard
to this section is that now the holding company is permitted to provide
services for any subsidiary and not just its bank subsidiary. While it
is possible that this providing of services to all subsidiaries could lead
to abuse, the Federal Reserve Board will probably enforce this section
in such a way as to comply with the intention of Congress in its
passage of the Act.7 8
The effect of the divestiture requirement established in section
74 1970 Amendments § 1843(c)(8).
75 AD. NEWS 5573.
76 1956 Act § 4(a)(2).
77 1970 Amendments § 1843(a)(2).
78 Cf. Banking at the Crossroads, address by William W. Sherrill, Member of Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, National Automation Conference of the Amer-
ican Bankers Association, May 3, 1971.
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1843(a)(2) depends upon the particular class to which the holding com-
pany belongs. The Act divides holding companies into four casses:
1) Companies which were bank holding companies under the 1956
Act.
2) Bank holding companies formed after the effective date of the 1970
Amendments.
3) Existing bank holding companies which were formed after June
30,1968.
4) Existing holding companies which were formed prior to July 1,
1968.
Bank holding companies falling into classes (1) and (2) must
divest themselves within two years of all subsidiaries which do not
meet the requirements of the Act.70 The Federal Reserve Board may
grant yearly extensions of this divestiture requirement, but in no event
may a holding company be granted more than three such extensions.
Holding companies falling into classes (3) and (4) have until
December 31, 1980, to dispose of subsidiaries which are required to
be divested.80 The difference between class (3) and class (4) is that
if the holding company falls into class (3), it may legally continue its
unauthorized operations until December 31, 1980. On the other
hand, class (4) holding companies have been given a potential exten-
sion of the December 31, 1980 divestiture requirement with regard
to activities that the holding company's subsidiaries were legally en-
gaged in since June 30, 1968. These subsidiaries need not be divested
unless the Board provides an opportunity for a hearing, and at that
time, determines that the continuation of these non-banking activities
would be in violation of the Act. If the Board does make such a
decision, the holding company is required to divest itself of this sub-
sidiary within ten years of the date of such decision. In the case of
holding companies with assets of over $60 million, the Federal
Reserve Board must make this determination within two years of the
effective date of the Act.8 '
The Senate version of H.R. 6778 would have exempted all one-
bank holding companies, which became such prior to July 1, 1968,
from the coverage of the 1970 Amendments. The House Bill would
have exempted all which were formed prior to May 9, 1956, had
banking assets of less than 30 million and possessed non-banking
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assets of less than 10 million. These proposed exemptions became
known as the "grandfather clauses." It is significant to note that
under the Senate version, 82 percent of the bank holding companies
would have escaped the coverage of the 1970 Amendments. 2 The
joint conference rejected these "grandfather clauses" and substituted
a new provision. This brings all bank holding companies under the
coverage of the Act. It does not matter when they were formed or
what their size is. Under the new provision,s8 a company which became
covered by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, due to the 1970
Amendments, is permitted to engage in all activities which were per-
mitted on June 30, 1968 (or on a later date, if as of June 30, 1968, the
company had a written contract to purchase another involved in some
different activity). To be eligible for this exemption, the holding com-
pany must have been continuously active in this field since June 30,
1968 or a later date if it were under control as of June 30, 1968. For-
tunately, the right to remain in these activities is not an absolute one,
as it was in the version adopted by the Senate. The Act requires the
Federal Reserve Board to determine, within two years, whether
each affected holding company should be allowed to continue to
enjoy the benefits of the exemption . 4 This only applies to companies
which have assets in excess of 60 million dollars.8 5 The Board must
withdraw the benefits unless the holding company proves that there
would not be an "undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair
competition, conflict of interest or unsound banking practices" if the
exemption were to remain in force.8 6 The reason for the "assets over 60
million" figure is that the exemption was primarily intended to protect
the traditional small town bank holding company, which the conferees
believed provided special services to small communities and was not
a major factor in the American economy. However, the House Man-
agers were careful to point out that this 60 million figure is not a
cut-off point and that the Board is free to remove the exemption from
those holding companies with assets of less than 60 million if it deems
the removal to be for the public benefit.87 The main reason Congress
passed the Act with this 60 million figure was to establish a set of
priorities for the Board. As holding companies with assets in excess of
60 million are potentially more dangerous to the economy, it was
82S. RE P. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (Supplementary view of Senators
Goodell and Proxmire) [reprinted in AD. NEWS 5519, 5549].
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determined that the Board should look into -their exemptions first.88
The Board may take away the exemption despite an initial decision
to allow it to remain. The Board is free to order termination of all
nonbanking activities, some nonbanking activities or specified areas of
one nonbanking activity. 9
The conferees also agreed to exempt the following types of hold-
ing companies from the Act:
1) Labor unions and agricultural and horticultural organizations were
exempted from section 4.
2) A company 85 percent or more of whose stock was owned by the
same family as of June 30, 1968 and continuously thereafter, was
exempted from section 4.
3) Any federally insured trust company or mutual savings banks which
own one bank, if it owned it on the date of enactment and such
ownership is authorized by state law.
4) A bank which is chartered as a bank but does not make commercial
loans.
5) The Federal Reserve Board may approve one exemption for any
company controlling a bank operated for the purpose of facilitating
transactions in foreign commerce if the Board determines that
such control would not be at substantial variance with the purposes
of the Act and would be in the public interest.
6) Exemption from section 4 of the Act for (a) any company the
greater part of whose business is conducted outside the United
States and (b) any company doing no business in the United States.
In both (a) and (b) the Federal Reserve Board must find that the
exemption would not be substantially at variance with the Act and
would be in the public interest.
7) Any bank controlled through a company wholly owned by thrift
institutions; if the bank restricts itself to the acceptance of deposits
from thrift institutions, deposits in connection with the corporate
business of its owners, and deposits of public monies.90
However, all of the above exemptions may be removed by the
Federal Reserve Board if it decides that they are not in the public
interest.
The final type of exemption which the Federal Reserve Board has
been authorized to grant applies to one-bank holding companies which
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variance with the purposes of the Act and is justifiable on one of the
following conditions:
1) Where the forced sale of either the held-bank or a subsidiary would
disrupt "business relationships that have existed over a long period
of years without adversely affecting the banks or the communities
they serve."
2) Where there is a "possibility that if the holding company were
forced to sell the bank it could not find a local buyer."
3) Where it is quite evident that because of the small size of the held-
bank it "could not be used in any meaningful way to advance the
interests of other affiliated companies.91
All of these exemptions are justifiable and the Board has the
power to take them away if the holding company begins to abuse the
privilege.
The Act contains an anti-tie-in section which prohibits the held-
bank from providing any credit, property or service to a customer on
condition that he obtain from the bank some additional credit, prop-
erty or service other than "loan, discount, deposit, or trust service" or
that he provide to the bank some additional credit, property or ser-
vice.92 It also prohibits any held-bank from supplying a customer with
credit, property or service on the condition that he must obtain from,
or provide to, the holding company or any other subsidiary thereof
some additional credit, property, or service.93 Moreover, it forbids any
forced agreement that the customer of the held-bank not obtain other
credit, property, or service from a competitor of the bank, the holding
company or a subsidiary. Still, the bank may make a reasonable require-
ment along these lines to ensure soundness of credit.94 Exempted from
these sections are tie-in agreements involving traditional bank services,
i.e., loans, deposits, discounts, and trust services. A held-bank is free to
tie-in these four traditional activities but if it ties any of them to
another service offered by either the bank, the holding company or a
subsidiary, the exemption does not apply.95
Finally, the Act gives standing to any present or potential com-
petitor to join as a party in interest before the Board and in the courts95
where the Board has rendered a decision against the competitor. The
Act speaks of three instances wherein the competitor or potential com-
91 Id. 5574-75.
92 1970 Amendments § 1972(1), (3).
93 Id. § 1972(2), (4).
94 Id. § 1972(5).
95 AD. NiWs 5579.
96 1970 Amendments § 1850.
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petitor has standing. These are (1) where an applicant seeks authority
to acquire a subsidiary which is a bank under section 1842 of this title;
(2) where an applicant seeks authority to engage in a nonbanking ac-
tivity under section 1843; and (3) where the holding company is seeking
to engage in a business practice which is prohibited by the tie-in pro-
vision.97 The House Managers were careful to stress that these three in-
stances should not be construed as the only times competitors and
potential competitors have standing with regard to the 1970 Amend-
ments.98 The Managers believed that the "broadest possible forum"
should be available for adversary proceedings to take place in order
that all issues be aired completely.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On Monday, December 21, 1970, the Act as passed by Congress,
was sent to President Nixon for approval. The President signed the
bill into law on December 31, 1970,9 the last day of the 1970 legislative
session. Reactions by bankers and competitors of bank holding com-
panies were predictably diverse. The bankers have intimated a belief
that the new amendments give the Federal Reserve Board more flexi-
bility in allowing the holding companies to expand their investments
while the competitors are convinced the amendments have not so
liberalized the Act. It has been predicted that this dispute will ulti-
mately be tested in the courts.10 0 It does appear, however, that at
least one member of the Federal Reserve Board firmly believes that
the amendments are to be implemented by the Board in such a way
as to ensure that there is a clearcut distinction between banking and
commerce. 101
On January 25, 1971, the Federal Reserve Board proposed a list of
ten activities to be regarded under the new law as closely related to
banking or managing or controlling banks, and thus regarded as per-
missible areas for bank holding companies' participation. 10 2 These
proposed activities included:
a. [ajny bank holding company may apply to the Board by filing
an application with its Federal Reserve Bank, for permission to
retain or acquire an interest in a company that engages solely in
one or more of the following activities:
97 Id. For tie-in provisions, see generally id. §§ 1971-78.
93 AD. NEws 5580-81.
99 Nixon Signs Holding Company Measure, Closing Loophole to One-Bank Institu-
tions, AmEmcmN BANKER (Jan. 4, 1971).
100 Id.
101 See note 78 supra.
102 Proposed Fed. Res. Bd. Regs., Reg. Y § 222.4(a)(1-10), 36.Fed. Reg. 1480, (1971).
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1. Making, for its own account or for the account of others,
loans such as would be made, for example, by a mortgage,
finance, or factoring company;
2. Operating as an industrial bank;
3. Servicing loans;
4. Acting as fiduciary;
5. Acting as investment or financial adviser, including for a
mortgage investment trust or a real estate investment trust;
6. Leasing personal property, where the initial lease provides
for payment of rentals that will reimburse the lessor for the
full purchase price of the property;
7. Acting as insurance agent or broker principally in connec-
tion with extensions of credit by the holding company or
any of its subsidiaries;
8. Acting as insurer for the holding company and its sub-
sidiaries or with respect to insurance sold by the holding
company or any of its subsidiaries as agent or broker;
9. Providing bookkeeping or data processing services for (i) the
holding company and its subsidiaries, (ii) other financial
institutions, or (iii) others, Provided That the value of
services performed by the company for such persons is not a
principal portion of the total value of all such services
performed; or
10. Making equity investments in community rehabilitation
and development corporations engaged in providing better
housing and employment opportunities for low-income and
moderate income populations. 103
As previously mentioned, the Board received its authority to propose
these regulations under amended section 1843(c)(8) in conjunction
with section 1844(b) of the Act.
All interested parties were given an opportunity to comment 10 4 on
these regulations. 10 5 In view of the tremendous volume of comments
received and requests for hearings, the Federal Reserve Board on
March 22, 1971,106 scheduled three separate sessions in April and May
to discuss its regulatory proposals.
The proposed regulations of January 26th also included a spelling
out of the procedures the Board would use in implementing amended
section 1843(c)(12) of the Act, which deals with divestitures and acqui-
sitions before January 1, 1981. The regulations would have allowed a
holding company which had filed an irrevocable declaration of its
intent to cease to be a bank holding company by January 1, 1981, to
103 Id. (emphasis added).
104 Id. at 1431.
105 Id.
106 Fed. Res. Bd., Press Release, Mar. 22, 1970.
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enter into new activities without further action by the Board unless
the Board suspended the authority to do so. The procedure established
was simple. The company need only notify the Board of its proposed
acquisition within 45 days of the actual transaction. If the Board did
not reject the proposed acquisition within this time, it was deemed to
have approved it. The purpose of this regulation was to allow large
conglomerates holding only one bank to continue in their nonfinan-
cial activities, with the understanding that they would divest themselves
of the bank. This ensures an orderly transition and does not force the
seventy or so conglomerates, such as J.C. Penney Co., Sperry and
Hutchinson, and Kinney National Services, Inc., to immediately sell
their banks at substantial losses.10 7 The Board stated that if no such
declaration is filed, no acquisitions could be made or activity com-
menced under section 1843(c)(12) without prior Board approval. This
consent would only be granted where the company demonstrates that
the activities sought are necessary to enable the more efficient market-
ing of assets subject to divestiture.108
In the January 26, 1971 proposed regulations, the Federal Re-
serve Board also announced that a holding company would be allowed
to enter into the above listed activities de novo if it notified the
Federal Reserve Board of its intention to do so and the Board does
not reject such a plan.109 On the other hand, where the holding company
proposes to engage in one of the ten activities through acquisition of a
going concern, the board has established more stringent procedures.
The application to the Board for such an acquisition must be published
in the Federal Register, and a competitor is to be given the opportunity
for a hearing wherein the applicant would be required to prove to the
satisfaction of the Board that the activities of the proposed application
would not create an undue concentration of economic resources or
decrease competition and that they would be beneficial to the public.
Thus, de novo entry into these fields would be given almost auto-
matic approval while entry through acquisition would be put to a
severe test.
The Board also proposed regulations to implement section
1843(c)(5) of the Act. It decided to limit lending and fiduciary ac-
tivities under 1843(c)(5) to those commenced de novo unless the shares
involved are of the kinds and amounts explicitly eligible for invest-
107 Foldessy, Big Diversified Concerns that own Banks Will Have to Unload Them
Under a New Law, WALL STaa JOURNAL, Mar. 11, 1971, at 30, col. 1.
108 Note 106 supra.
109 Proposed Fed. Res. Bd. Regs., Reg Y § 222A(b)(1). 36 Fed. Reg. 1431 (1971).
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ment by a national bank under federal law.110 This proposed regula-
tion would not affect the scope of activities permitted to a banking
subsidiary but could affect acquisitions of a nonbanking company by
the bank, since an acquisition by the held-bank would actually be an
indirect acquisition by the holding company. In this manner, the
holding companies could not acquire nonbanking firms indirectly.
At one of the three hearings which was scheduled for April 16,
1971, concerning data processing and bookkeeping services, interested
parties were invited to submit their comments on the following ques-
tions:
(1) What, if any, limitations should apply to a holding company
performing (itself or through a nonbank subsidiary) payroll,
accounts receivable and billing services?
(2) To what extent, if any, and by what measure should the hold-
ing company be limited in the other data processing services
that it may perform for persons other than itself, its sub-
sidiaries, and other financial institutions?"'
The arguments presented at the hearings were predictable. The
banks wanted all ten proposed activities to be approved and to be sig-
nificantly expanded. The competitors desired that some of the pro-
posed activities be either deleted or severely restricted.
One supposedly minor change desired by the banks was the dele-
tion of the word "solely" from subparagraph (a) of the proposed
regulations.112 By deleting this one word, the entire meaning of the
regulations would be changed and the purposes of the act would be
frustrated. Without limiting the proposed regulations to "solely" the
specified ten activities, the regulations would, in effect, be providing
that a holding company could acquire or create de novo any corpora-
tion in any field as long as it was also active in one of the ten enumer-
ated activities.
The banks also wished to significantly expand upon the ten
activities. For example, the first activity proposed in paragraph a(l)
would allow the holding company to participate in "making for its
own account or for the account of others, loans such as would be
made, for example, by a mortgage, finance, or factoring company~1 3
The banks submitted comments suggesting that this paragraph would
110 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
111 Note 106 supra.
112 See, e.g., Comments, Wachovia Corporation, submitted to Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve System, at 5 (Feb. 26, 1971).
113 Proposed Fed. Res. Bd. Regs., Reg Y § 222.4(a)(1-10), 36 Fed. Reg. at 1431 (1971).
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allow all sorts of activities which were probably not envisioned by the
Federal Reserve Board." 4
114 On Feb. 26, 1971, the Wachovia Corporation submitted its comments to the Board
of Governors concerning the proposed regulations which the Board had issued. With
regard to the proposed regulation which would allow one-bank holding companies to
"make for its own account or for the account of others, loans such as would be made,
for example, by a mortgage, finance or factoring company," the Wachovia Corporation
suggested that this proposal should be interpreted broadly enough to include:
A. Mortgage Company
1. Guidelines of permissible activities
a. Originate or purchase for own account or for others, in whole or
through participations, the following types of real estate loans:
(I) Permanent loans
(2) Land and land development loans
(3) Construction loans
(4) Interim loans
53 Loans secured by junior liens or mortgages on real property
Other loans either unsecured or secured by collateral other than
liens on real property
b. Take or otherwise acquire an equity position, either individually or
as a partner in a joint venture, in any type of real estate project.
c. Service loans (as indicated in Subparagraph (a)(3)) for own account or
for others.
d. Act as insurance agent, broker or underwriter in connection with mort-
gage banking activities for all types of coverage including casualty, title
and credit risk insurance.
e. Act as manager or advisor to a mortgage investment trust, a real es-
tate investment trust, or to a dosed end real estate or mortgage in-
vestment fund as indicated in Subparagraph (a)(5).
f. Warehouse loans
g. Provide the following services generally associated with mortgage bank-
ing services:
(1) Buy and sell real estate for own account or others
(2) Act as manager for all types of real estate
(8) Act as leasing agent, consultant and provide other real estate ad-
visory services
(4) Act as builder-developer for own account or for others
(5) Act as syndicator for real estate including both development an.
sales
(6) Provide consulting services
h. Conduct such other activities that may now or hereafter be or become
an accepted activity for the mortgage banking industry so as to com-
petitively provide a complete mortgage banking service.
2. To compete effectively in its industry, a mortgage company associated with
a bank holding company must be able to provide financing and financial
services on the same basis as any other mortgage banking firm or related
company, including Commercial Banks, Savings and Loan Associations, In-
surance Companies, and other integrated real estate financing and devel-
opment companies. Greater convenience to the public and more efficient
operations can only be achieved by vigorous competition with such non-
regulated companies.
3. The proposed publication of notice and 45-day minimum waiting period
applied to the mere move of an office location within the same geographic
area, the de novo expansion into a new geographic area, or the acquisi-
tion of an established business would unduly restrict a mortgage banking
subsidiary's ability to compete with non-regulated companies and should
not be required except for economically significant merger activity.
B. Finance and Factoring Companies
1. Guidelines of permissible activities
a. Sales Finance Operations, consisting of.
(1) Discounting installment notes receivable issued to dealers by pur-
chasers and secured by title-retaining instruments on automobiles
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The banks went through all ten of the proposed activities in a
similar manner, expanding on them to include almost every conceiv-
able activity which could fit under the enumerated category. The
justification consistently given was that the affiliate of a bank holding
company must be allowed to operate on a basis substantially identical
to its direct competitors in order for the public to obtain maximum
benefits from such a company. It would seem that the banks overlooked
the fact that before the 1970 Amendments, the held-affiliates were
allowed to operate on such a basis and as a result, unfair competitive
advantage was available to the held-affiliates through the financial
resources of the held-bank.
The competitors of bank holding companies obviously wanted all
ten activities, if deemed permissible, to be as limited as possible. Data
processing companies and insurance agencies were against holding
company entry into these two fields no matter how limited.
The main points of contention brought up by the competitors
were: (1) de novo entry has nothing to do with whether an activity is
permissible and, therefore, should not be looked upon so favorably by
the Board; and (2) the banks' proposal to delete the term "solely" from
(A)(1) should not be permitted, as Congress intended to forbid all un-
authorized activities, no matter how minor.115
With regard to the de novo entry concept, the competitors saw it
as an artificial distinction. They pointed out that it plays an extremely
limited role in the antitrust field and should be given no more con-
and other chattels, and real estate. Also included in this classi-
fication are discount-basis (or add-on) installment loans, other than
loans made under small loan acts, made direct to borrowers, with
automobiles, other chattels, or real estate as security, or unsecured.
(2) Advancing funds to dealers on their interest-bearing demand notes,
collateralized by automobiles or other chattels.
(3) Making capital loans to dealers, short-term advances to dealers se-
cured by assignment of fleet sale invoices, and other loans and ad-
vances not included in the above classifications.
b. Making, arranging and servicing consumer installment loans to bor-
rowers, with household goods or other chattels as security, or unse-
cured. These consist of discount-basis (or add-on) loans and, to a
minor extent, interest-bearing loans made under the provisions of
small loan acts or similar regulatory laws.
c. Commercial financing operations, consisting of: factoring or accounts
receivable arising from the sales of furniture, wearing apparel, hosiery,
yarn and other manufactured products; making advances to factored
companies, generally unsecured; discounting installment notes receiv-
able secured by title-retaining instruments on commercial equipment,
etc.; and making other loans and advances to businesses, generally se-
cured by chattel mortgages on equipment or by assignment of accounts
receivable or inventories.
d. Conduct such other activities that may now or hereafter be or become
an accepted activity for the finance industry so as to competitively pro-
vide financing service.
i1r) Matter of Proposed Amendments to § 222.4 of Regulation Y. Supplemental Com-
ments of American Courier Corporation (Apr. 30, 1971).
PRECLUDING ZAIBATSU
sideration here.110 Entry whether de novo or through acquisition
should be denied if the activity is not permissible. The competitors'
complaint was that the Board's proposed rules did not set down any
hearing requirement wherein competitors could attempt to prove that
the activity was not "closely related to banking."117 De novo entry can
lead to tie-ins, tying effects, subsidized pricing practices and other
forms of unfair competitive practices just as easily as can entry by
acquisition11s
The competitors were also strongly against deleting the word
"solely" from paragraph (A) of the proposed regulations. This, they
concluded, would frustrate the intention of Congress by allowing
banks to participate in activities not "closely related to banking" as
long as the subsidiary engaged in such was also participating in one of
the ten proposed activities." 9
As a result of the hearings held on these activities (not including
data processing and insurance), the Federal Reserve Board, on May
20, 1971, announced that the following amendments to section 224(a),
(b) and (c) of Regulation Y would go into effect on June 13, 1971:
This is part of Permissible activities:
[A]ny bank holding company may engage, or retain or acquire an
interest in a company that engages, solely in one or more of the
activities specified below ... :
1. Making or acquiring, for its own account or for the account
of others, loans and other extensions of credit (including issuing
letters of credit and accepting drafts), such as would be made,
for example, by a mortgage, finance, credit card, or factoring
company.
2. Operating as an industrial bank, Morris Plan bank or industrial
loan company, in the manner authorized by State law so long
as the institution does not both accept demand deposits and
make commercial loans.
3. Servicing loans and other extensions of credit for any person.
4. Performing and carrying on any one or more of the functions
or activities that may be performed or carried on by a trust
company (including activities of a fiduciary, agency, or custodial
nature) in the manner authorized by state law so long as the
institution does not both accept demand deposits and make
commercial loans.
5. Acting as investment or financial adviser, including (i) serving
as the advisory company for a mortgage or a real estate invest-
ment trust and (ii) furnishing economic or financial information.
11o Id. at 4.
117 Id. at 5-6.
118 Id. at 4.
119 Id. at 13-14.
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6. Leasing personal property and equipment, or acting as agent,
broker, or adviser in leasing such property, where at the incep-
tion of the initial lease the expectation is that the effect of the
transaction and reasonably anticipated future transactions with
the same lessee as to the same property will be to compensate
the lessor for not less than the lessor's full investment in the
property.
7. Making equity and debt investments in corporations or projects
designed primarily to promote community welfare, such as the
economic rehabilitation and development of low-income
areas.120
Comparison of those regulations proposed to those finally passed
indicates that the holding companies were successful, to a limited ex-
tent, in expanding the scope of permissible activities.
The regulation dealing with de novo entry was significantly
changed in that competitors are now given an opportunity to have a
hearing regarding de novo entry as well as for the question of entry
through acquisition. The new procedure set up for this is that the
holding company must publish notification of the proposed activity in
a newspaper of general circulation in the area to be served. A com-
petitor may then submit adverse comments to its Federal Reserve Bank,
which will take the comments into consideration. If the bank holds
against the competitor, he has a right of direct appeal to the Federal
Reserve Board.
On August 24, 1971, the Board changed the requirement of publi-
cation of notice concerning the bank holding companies' entrance into
the activity of insurance agencies. Now, the only time the holding com-
pany need publish notice is when it must demonstrate that there are
inadequate insurance agency facilities in the community in which it
wishes to sell insurance. This modification went into effect on Septem-
ber 1, 1971.121 It is probable that the insurance agency competitors of
the holding companies will challenge the authority of the Federal
Reserve Board to promulgate such a regulation.
On May 14, 1971, the Board announced a regulatory amendment
specifying the kinds of activities subsidiaries of bank holding com-
panies could engage in on the basis of section 1843(c)(5) of the 1970
Amendments.122 This became effective July 1, 1971. Section 1843(c)(5)
covers the acquisition by a holding company of shares eligible for
investment by a national bank. The amendment allows bank holding
120 Fed. Res. Bd. Regs., Reg. Y, § 222.4(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 10777 (1971).
121 Fed. Extends 1-Bank Firm Authority, J. CoMm., Aug. 26, 1971 at 3, col. 6.
122 Fed. Res. Bd., Press Release, May 14, 1971.
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companies to acquire shares that are explicitly eligible for investment
by a national bank under federal statutes. It does not so restrict
held-banks; the national held-banks may acquire shares in accordance
with the rules of the Comptroller of the Currency. This amendment is
viewed unfavorably by the competitors of one.bank holding companies,
for it marks a significant change from the Board's proposed regulations
of January 26, 1971. The Board, on January 26, 1971, had issued a
proposed regulation which would have restricted section 1843(c)(5)
acquisitions to those expressly allowed national banks under federal
statutes.m The new regulation permits national held-banks to escape
this prohibition and to be restricted instead by the Comptroller of the
Currency, who is generally regarded to be more liberal in this area.124
On June 10, 1971, the Board of Governors issued an order per-
taining to data processing activities of one-bank holding companies.125
Under the proposed regulation, one-bank holding companies were per-
mitted to engage directly or through a subsidiary in "providing book-
keeping or data processing services for (i) the holding company and its
subsidiaries, (ii) other financial institutions, or (iii) others: Provided,
That the value of services performed by the company for such persons
is not a principal portion of the total value of all such services per-
formed.' 126 As a result of the hearings and the written comments the
Board received, it decided to use a qualitative description of services
to be performed rather than a quantitative one. Thus, the regulation
allows one-bank holding companies to "(i) provide bookkeeping or data
processing services for the internal operations of the holding company
and its subsidiaries, and (ii) storing and processing other banking,
financial, or related economic data, such as performing payroll, ac-
counts receivable or payable, or billing services."'17 The Board did
require that all record-keeping and data processing services be finan-
cially oriented. This should serve to limit one-bank holding companies
to the financial area and protect the independent data processing
centers, as they otherwise would have been stripped of any competi-
tive position had the Federal Reserve Board given the congenerics
carte blanche in this area. One problem could arise from the last state-
ment of the Board's interpretation of proper data processing activities.
It allows one-bank holding companies to furnish data processing ser-
123 Proposed Fed. Res. Bd. Regs., Reg. Y, § 222A(2)(1-10), 36 Fed. Reg. 1430 (1971).
124 See generally Edwards, The One-Bank Holding Company Conglomerate: Analysis
and Evaluation, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1275 (1969).
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vices upon request to customers if the service is not otherwise avail-
able in the relevant market. 28 Still, it remains to be seen how far the
Board will allow the one-bank holding companies to go under this par-
ticular section.
On August 5, 1971, the Board of Governors released its rulings
on the subject of permissible insurance activities for one-bank hold-
ing companies. 129 A hearing had been held on May 12, 1971 to decide
whether to implement the Board's proposed regulation with regard to
insurance activities. The proposed regulation read "acting as insurance
agent or broker principally in connection with extensions of credit
by the holding company and its subsidiaries. . "...,130 The one-bank
holding companies were able to significantly expand this permissible
activity. Not only were they granted the right to act as insurance agent
with respect to insurance directly related to an extension of credit by
a bank or bank-related firm, but they were also permitted to act as in-
surance agent for any insurance that is otherwise sold as a matter of
convenience to the purchaser. The only limitation on this is that the
aggregate premium income from these sales cannot constitute a sig-
nificant portion of the aggregate insurance premium income of the
holding company from insurance sold. In all likelihood, the Federal
Reserve Board will have to set up a certain percentage cut-off point in
deciding what is a significant portion of the aggregate insurance pre-
mium income. Once the one-bank holding companies know what this per-
centage figure will be, it would seem, if their conduct should continue,
that they will begin an aggressive campaign to sell their financially-re-
lated insurance. In this matter, they can sell more non-financial insur-
ance and cause an ever increasing harm to independent insurance agents.
The one-bank holding companies also have been given the right to
act as insurance agents for any insurance which would be sold in com-
munities with a population of under 5,000 or in communities where
the holding company can prove inadequate insurance agency facili-
ties exist.' 3 ' It will be interesting to see how the Federal Reserve Board
decides cases where the holding company attempts to prove that the in-
volved community has inadequate insurance agency facilities.
On September 7, 1971 the Board of Governors proposed to permit
bank holding companies to perform property management services.
This would include farm management, managing office buildings and
other industrial properties, managing residences, be they single-family
128 Fed. Res. Bd. Regs., Reg. Y, § 222.123(g), 36 Fed. Reg. 11806 (1971).





dwellings or high-rise apartment, buildings, plus the management of
air rights and oil and mineral rights. 32 However, it would not include
the buying and selling of property or the development of real estate.183
All interested parties were invited to comment on this proposed amend-
ment to Regulation Y by October 8, 1971. It is noteworthy that each
and every time the Board proposes one of these new activities, it seems
to have already deemed that particular field of endeavor as "closely
related to banking" and is having hearings solely to decide the "public
benefits" issue. One is curious as to the Board's reasoning behind this
particular proposal-managing of oil wells is "so closely related to
banking" as to be a proper incident thereto.
CONCLUSION
Whether the 1970 Bank Holding Company Amendments will be
completely successful in preventing the Zaibatsu System from arising
in the United States remains to be seen. The bank holding com-
panies are pressuring the Federal Reserve Board to consider many
activities, aside from those already named, as "closely related to bank-
ing."'134 It would appear that if the Board were to sanction these ac-
tivities, the holding companies would be nearly as free to enter
non-banking vicinages as they were prior to the 1970 legislation. The
success or failure of these recent amendments depends upon the in-
terpretation given them by the Federal Reserve Board. Competitors
of bank holding companies have already expressed the fear that the
132 Fed. Res. Bd., Press Release, Sept. 7, 1971.
133 Id.
134 Letter from Donald L. Rogers, Executive Director of the Association of Registered
Bank Holding Companies to the Secretary of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, April 1, 1971. In this letter, Mr. Rogers proposed thirteen additional
activities for the Board's consideration. Thus, the Association of Registered Bank Holding
Companies has taken the position that the following activities are "so closely related to
banking... as to be a proper incident thereto."
(11) Providing investment management services on either a commingled or non-
commingled basis for agency accounts;
(12) Operating as an issuer of travelers checks, or travelers insurance, or as a
travel agent;
(13) Operating as a savings and loan association;(14) Providing armored cars and messenger services;
(15) Operating as a credit bureau or providing other credit reporting services;
(16) Providing property management services;
(17) Acting as a custom house broker and freight forwarder;(18) Providing industrial and urban development services;
(19) Providing business and farm management consulting services;
(20) Operating as an agency for financial advertising or financial public relations;
(21) Operating as an agency for the training or employment of financial per-
sonnel;
(22) Providing tax return preparation services;
(23) Providing economic or financial consulting services.
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Board is rubber-stamping approval of every holding company applica-
tion.135 Should this apprehension be realized, the 1970 Amendments
will merely serve to postpone but not to preclude the American Zaibatsu
System.
135 Missouri Bankers Open Drive, J. Comm., Sept. 8, 1971, at 3, col. 6.
